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Why a Separate Safety Program? 
Some what pessimistically, James Reason and others have discussed the 
inherent trade-off of ‘safety versus production’ 
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Either way, the role of a safety program is not just to address safety, 





‘or’ Safety Production ‘versus’ 
Without Knowledge of This Trade-space… 
… somebody will need to make a decision whether to implement a new function or 




If they err optimistically,  
we may have safety too low! 
If they err conservatively,  
uncertainty about safety 
will stifle innovation!  
Either error reflects the need 
for fundamental knowledge ! 
A Simple View… Single-Point Failures 
• The simplest viewpoint considers 
accidents the response to  single, 
identifiable faults and failures 
• A good starting point is to eliminate the 
potential for single-point failures, or 
simple error chains… 
 
 
But this alone won’t get us the safety 
levels we need! 
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paccident = pfailure1 + pfailure2 
Building Up – Reason’s ‘Swiss Cheese’ 
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Organizational and technical factors  create holes in safety nets 
paccident = pfailure1*pfailure2*platent1*platent2 
 
Building Further – Strong Coupling 




• Mechanisms then exist for cascading and compounding 
failures developing non-linearly into accidents 
– These behaviors can’t be captured with fault trees! 
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paccident = pfailure1*pfailure2{failure1}*pfailure3{failure1 & failure2}*… 
 
Which Does Classic ‘Risk’ Modeling Lead? 
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Normal = 100% Safe with No Degradations? 
Risks Degrade Safety  
Corollary: Eliminate Risks, 
Disturbances & Degradations 
– Stick to Your Normative 
State – and Safety is Ensured 
Risk Models Can Only Model 
the Negative – They Can’t 
Model What Restores Us to 
Safe Operations  
Modeling Resilience 
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Normal = 100% Safe with No Degradations? 
Risks Degrade Safety  
Modeling Resilience 
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Normal = Constant Variation 
Risks Degrade Safety  
Other Processes Restore Safety! 
Success or Failure? 
 
Which Aspects of this 
Accident Should We Focus 
On? 
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V&V of Autonomy and 
Authority 
Built-in Robustness to Icing 













Hue -> Principle Discipline or Domain 









Major function of program office is to frequently review existing and 
proposed research for: 
– Consistency with and support of clear national need 
• Current safety technical and operational problems 
• Potential future safety technical and operational problems 
• Safety constraining innovation  
– Need for long-term fundamental science and engineering research 
– Alignment with unique NASA charter 
– Other selection considerations 
• Appropriate resources, workforce and facilities 
• Sustaining commitments 
 
Must ensure flexibility to consider new research areas and urgent 
problems 
Process for Identifying Emerging Research Needs 














(tools, publications, models, data, 
annual tech conference) 
Program-wide 
Research activities 
National Aeronautics R & D Policy & Plan 
What research is vital to civil 
aeronautics? 
 And what should the government do? 
 
 
What “infrastructure” should be 
maintained as a national resource? 


















(tools, publications, models, data, 
annual tech conference) 
Program-wide 
Research activities 
Note: This chart only applies to commercial aircraft weighing more than 60,000 lbs.  
From Isolated Sensors -> Systems Reasoning 
It’s not about the sensors alone – 
It’s about making sense of them! 
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Monitoring and Prediction of Safety Issues from 
Operational Data 
• Anomaly detection method that has the 
ability to detect at least three anomalies in 
fleet-wide heterogeneous data sources. 
• Forecasting technology that has the ability 
to predict at least 3 known anomalies in real 
or emulated data of large, fleet-wide 
heterogeneous data sources 
• Develop techniques to classify text reports 
into anomaly categories.  
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
KEY MILESTONES RESEARCH APPROACH 
• Develop data mining tools to uncover 
potential safety issues from massive data 
sources containing discrete, continuous, and 
textual information. 
• Tools must scale to massive data sources 
and provide automated detection, diagnosis, 
and prognosis capabilities at the fleet-level. 
• 3.3.4 (FY12Q4): Forecasting fleet-level anomalies 
from massive data sources. 
• 1.3.1.3 (FY10Q4): Anomaly detection in distributed 
and centralized data systems and deploy 
algorithms. 
• 1.3.3.4 (FY011Q4): Develop methods to predict 
anomalies in combined continuous and discrete 
sources. 
• 1.3.5.1 (FY11Q4): Implement two prototype tools to 
evaluate airspace system health. 
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Key Policy Questions (Without Technical Insight) 
+ Who ‘owns’ the data? 
+ May the government possess it? 
 NASA (Research) 
 FAA (Regulatory) 
+ If the government possesses it, can they protect it? 
 Can it fit under the ‘proprietary’ clause of FOIA? 
+ If the government might release it, should the owner 
of the data release it? 
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September 2008 24 
Stakeholders 
September 2008 25 
National and International Reputation 
 ASRS Recognized Model for Proactive Contribution to Safety & 
Risk Management Process 
Int’l Confidential Aviation Safety Systems (ICASS) 
• Includes 12 countries modeled after ASRS 
 
Firefighters Near Miss Reporting System 
• Launched August, 2005 was modeled after ASRS 
• Development Task Force includes FAA and NASA ASRS 
 
Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C3RS) 
• Railroad Safety Reporting System was modeled after ASRS 
• Under development through collaboration with Federal Rail 
Administration, Volpe National Transportation System Center, and 
Railroad Industry 
Patient Safety Reporting System (PSRS) 
• Collaboration between NASA ASRS and Dept of VA, National 
Center for Patient Safety  
 
Confidential Safety Reporting Systems 
Key Policy Questions (With Technical Insight) 
+ Are there intermediate levels of analysis 
 ‘In-house’ methods on observable data 
 ‘Out-of-house’ methods for national assessment 
 
+ Can government agencies provide standard data 
mining tools and protocols to data-owners? 
 Data stays ‘in-house’ with owners 
 Results of data-mining  
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What To Do With the Insights Gained? 
+ Role of Government Research -> Industry 
+ Role of the Regulator: 
 Is it possible for a government agency to maintain 
sufficient oversight to achieve desired safety levels? 
 Or, do we involve multiple stakeholders in private-public 
partnerships that collectively achieve safety?! 
• Regulator (FAA) 
• Air Traffic Operator (FAA) 
• Aircraft Operators / Air Carriers 
• Airports 
• Labor 
• Airframers & Avionics Manufacturers 
• Technical Advisor (NASA) 











+ Aviation safety is the leader in safety in many domains! 
 
+ Technology is only part of the solution – and only if carefully coordinated 
with policy: 
 Ability to assess safety of – and certify – new developments 
 Data protections <-> Information sharing 






If they err optimistically,  
we may have safety too low! 
If they err conservatively,  
uncertainty about safety 
will stifle innovation!  
Either error reflects the need 
for fundamental knowledge ! 
